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THE REVENUE ACT OF 1951: ITS IMPACT
ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES
JOHN C. O'BYRNE*
T HE Revenue Act of 1951 is a phantasmagoria of taxes, sections,
ideas, philosophies, benefits and loopholes. Well over a hundred
different tax matters are touched specifically; the indirect results
are incalculable. Income, excess profits, estate, gift and excise taxes
-all received the attention of Congress in greater or lesser measure,
plus a few nonclassifiable items charged to miscellaneous. The
scope of the Act is appalling. Many of its provisions received wide
publicity, inter alia the rate increase,' the removal of the tax free
aspect of the President's expense account,2 the tax on bookies and
wagers,3 the lowered admission taxes on cut-price ladies' day
tickets, 4 the "television formula,"5 sale of a residence, 6 and capital
gains on livestock.7 Other provisions raised little hue and cry,
few huzzabs, yet in limited areas they are of immense importance
to particular taxpayers. Loophole closing made newscopy, yet one
is more impressed by the extent of the relief granted to special
classes ot taxpayers, quietly but effectively. It almost seems that
each special group received a taste of pie, while the rank and file
of taxpayers received its desserts in rate increases. Most of the
special benefit provisions are quite legitimate, alleviating harsh
results, or granting forgotten taxpayers consistent treatment. In
other cases, the overall policy behind the relief is obscure.,
The least that can be said is that many taxpayers came in for
special recognition one way or another. Cooperatives, mutual finan-
cial institutions, and state colleges are possible new taxpayers.
Farmers, miners, retailers, employees, executives, life insurance
salesmen, members of the armed forces, railroads, public utilities,
nonresident aliens, symphony orchestra societies, babies and chil-
*A.B., Syracuse University 1941; M.S., Maxwell Sch. of Citizenship &
Public Affairs 1943; LL.B., Harvard University 1948; Assistant Professor
of Law, College of Law, State University of Iowa.
1. See text p. 833-834 infra.
2. As well as that of the Vice President, Speaker and Members of
Congress, § 619 Revenue Act of 1951. Citation of a section without more
refers to the Internal Revenue Code. Citations to the 1951 Act will carry the
notation Rev. Act.
3. Chapter 27A added to the Code by § 471 Rev. Act.
4. § 401 Rev. Act, amending § 1700 (a).
5. § 459(d) added.
6. § 112(n) added.
7. § 117(j) amended.
8. It would be interesting to know, for example, how fishing trips came
to be exempt from a transportation tax. § 493 Rev. Act, amending § 3469(b).
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dren, sellers of homes, distillers who lost their spirits,9 etc., etc.,-
all received some measure of comfort from amendments to one or
another of the taxes. Other taxpayers, in addition to the rate rise,
were unfavorably touched. A wee drop, a cigarette, gasoline, a bet
on a horse, and many other more or less needful items cost more.
A few erstwhile tax dodges were denied to individual and cor-
porate taxpayers.
Scope of Article
It is obviously impossible to encompass very much of the new
Act in an article. A discussion of all the income tax sections would
be a larger bite than could be successfully chewed. Thus, it seemed
advisable to limit the discussion herein to the income tax sections
that are most likely to concern the individual and his attorney
in the normal preparation of returns and in planning the income
tax events of the year. No particular reference is made to other
taxes or taxpayers. Some of the innovations mentioned are of a
mechanical nature and have already become part of the working
kit of any lawyer who made out a 1951 return, e.g., increase of de-
pendent's gross income to $600. Other provisions, less well known
or more involved, are discussed in greater detail with such com-
ments as seem appropriate in the space allotted. For the most part
the provisions herein discussed became effective for taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1950. Comment on effective date will
be made only where there is an important deviation from that
pattern.
It is hardly necessary to admit that any attempt at generalized
treatment of many items inevitably leads to technical inaccuracy
and blurring of details. Any item of interest should be pursued in
the tax services or in specific articles.
I. MECHANICAL PROVISIONS
Those provisions of the Revenue Act of 1951 that made changes
or additions that are important to the tax structure, but hardly
subject to extensive comment, are suggested below in rather sum-
mary fashion. In most instances, the practitioner has become
acquainted with these provisions during the taxable year of 1951
since most of them were applicable for that year.
A. Rate Increases
Enough has been said and written about the rate increases of
9. No pun. § 498 Rev. Act.
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the last two Revenue Acts.10 Percentage comparisons abound, but
few of them make much sense because the partial increase in the
year of enactment of the Acts tends to cloud the extent of the
jump. A more graphic illustration arises from the comparison of
the tax due for each of the years 1949 through 1952. Most tax-
payers are less concerned with the percentage rise, but greatly
concerned over the relationship of the tax to gross income. Con-
sider the tax history of the married man with two dependents and
the single man, both earning .$5,000 per year:





The result is readily apparent, the small taxpayer upon whom
any revenue system must rest, becomes more important each year
to the Federal fisc. And he becomes more important to the attorney
and tax adviser as part of a growing group to whom sound tax ad-
vice can mean taxes saved.
In respect to the taxation of capital gains, the first rate change
in nearly a decade became effective in the Revenue Act of 1951.
There has always been a certain amount of agitation for increased
rates. In fact, the House bill recommended a rate of approximately
28%. 11 The Revenue Act of 1951 compromised on an increase in
the alternative tax rate to 26%/o,12 effective for the year 1952.1 1
B. Head of A Household
The law as it existed prior to the Individual Income Tax Act
of 1944 allowed a personal exemption to the "head of the family."
With the passage of the 1944 Act that particular concept disap-
peared from the Code.1 4 Such benefit reappears in the new Act
in the form of a special tax rate applicable to taxable years begin-
ning after October 31, 1951.15 The Senate Finance Committee
recognized the unequal tax treatment accorded a taxpayer who
maintained a household for the benefit of other individuals as against
10. § 101 (b) Revenue Act of 1950 and § 101 (a) Rev. Act, amending
§ 12(b).
11. H. R. 4473, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. Proposed Revenue Act of 1951
§ 101.
12. § 322(b) Rev. Act, amending § 117(c) (2) (B).
13. § 322(d) Rev. Act.
14. Report of Senate Committee on Finance on Individual Income Tax
Act of 1944, H. R. 4646, Sen. Rap. No. 885, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
15. § 301(a) Rev. Act substituting a new § 12(c).
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the married couple who might have their income treated as that of
two single individuals. The Committee Report assumes that the
sharing of one's income with a spouse is the rationale behind the
existing joint return provisions and then argues that the income of
the head of the household also is likely to be shared with a child
or other dependent to the extent necessary to maintain the home
and perhaps raise and educate the child or dependent.16 The result
is fine, but the premise is none too valid.'7
Approximately 50% of the benefits of husband-wife income
splitting are accorded a taxpayer who can qualify as head of a
household under the definition in section 12(c) (3). He must not
be married at the close of the taxable year, but must maintain as his
home a household which is the principal place of abode of a son,
stepson, daughter, stepdaughter, or a descendant of a son or
daughter of the taxpayer, or any person who is a dependent of the
taxpayer under section 25(b). Where the taxpayer maintains the
household as the principal place of abode for his unmarried children,
and stepchildren, or their descendants, he may qualify as the head of
a household even though he may not be entitled to an exemption for
those persons under section 25(b). s Otherwise, the person living
in the home must be a dependent for whom the taxpayer is entitled
to an exemption under section 25 (b).19 In any event, the taxpayer
must furnish over half of the costs of maintaining the household
during the taxable year.
2 0
It should be noted that an individual who files his return on a
Form 1040A will lose this benefit, since the Collector will use the
optional Tax Tables provided for a single person in computing the
tax.21 The use of the short Form 1040, however, will permit the
taxpayer to find his own tax under the column provided for a head
of a household. On the long Form 1040, a special rate schedule
applies to the head of a household.
16. Report of Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 4473, Sen. Rep. No.
781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § IIl(B) (2) (1951), hereafter cited as Sen. Fin.
Comm.
17. See Goodman, Observations on the Revenue Act of 1951, 20 Ford.
L. Rev. 273 (1951), in which the author demolishes the premise, and in the
bargain decries both the head of the household and split income provisions.
18. The Senate Finance Committee reasons that the limitations found
under § 25(b) are unnecessary in the case of children, stepchildren and
grandchildren, since these persons are part of the family unit, with a rela-
tionship similar to that between spouses. Sen. Fin. Comm. § III(B) (2).
19. § 12(c) (3) (B).
20. In no case may the status rest upon a married dependent, child, step-
child or descendan who has filed a joint return with a spouse.
21. § 51 (f) (1) and § 402, amended by § 301(b) Rev. Act.
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C. Gross Income of Dependents
The Revenue Act of 1948 raised to $600 the amount of the
dependency exemption, but left the gross income limit at $500.2-
There seems to be no good reason why Congress did not then raise
to $600 the gross income allowed a dependent before the taxpayer
was denied an exemption for him. The Senate Finance Committee
logically commented that "not only is the present treatment incon-
sistent but it leads inevitably to confusion on the part of the tax-
payer."2 3 The 1951 Act raised the amount to $600.24
D. Medical Expenses
The five per cent limitation on medical expenses of the tax-
payer and his spouse is removed if either the taxpayer or his spouse
is age 65 or over. The relief applies to the first year during which
one or the other becomes 65 years old, and continues thereafter. -
Medical expenses for dependents of the taxpayer are still subject
to the five per cent limitation. The maximum deduction allowable
for medical expenses remains at $1,250 per exemption claimed
(other than for age or blindness), up to a total of $2,500 on a separ-
ate return and $5,000 on a joint return. 26
The new provision makes tax planning of medical expenses
more important than ever. In many cases, it may be possible to
postpone expenses if one of the couple will reach 65 in the next
taxable year. Lumping of medical payments in one year and elect-
ing the optional standard deduction in another is often feasible.
Records take on added import since the taxpayer must be able to
separate expenses relating to himself and spouse from those in-
curred for others.
E. Elections re Joint Returns and Standard Deduction
Under section 51 of the Code prior to the Revenue Act of 1951,
married taxpayers had to elect whether to file a joint return or
separate returns at the time of filing, and such election was irre-
vocable. 7 The provisions of the new law now make it possible for
married individuals who filed separate returns for a taxable year
beginning after 1950 to elect to substitute a joint return even though
22. § 201 Revenue Act of 1946, amending § 25(b) (1).
23. Sen. Fin. Comm. § IV(B) (27).
24. § 310 Rev. Act, amending § 25(b) (1) (b).
25. § 307 (a) Rev. Act, amending § 23(x).
26. § 23(x).
27. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.51-1 (1943).
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the time for filing the return for the taxable year has expired.28 The
joint return must be filed within three years of the due date of the
return for the taxable year, and any irrevocable election as to
treatment of income, deductions, or credits may not be changed
in the making of the joint return.20 Note that a decision to file a
joint return is final on the due date of the return.
Likewise an election to take the standard deduction or to itemize
deductions is no longer final upon filing the return for all taxable
years after 1949.30 The net effect of this provision is that the tax-
payer who itemized his deductions when he filed his return may
now change that election and claim the standard deduction within
three years after the due date.21 The converse is also true. However
as to married taxpayers, both must elect to take the standard deduc-
tion or both must itemize.
F. Additional Withholding
Where an employee consistently found himself at the end of
the taxable year with insufficient taxes withheld to cover his in-
come tax liability, he had to dig deep and pay the amount of the
excess due as well as the first payment on his declaration for the
next year. Now he can avoid the March 15 willies by agreeing to
have his employer withhold from his wages an additional amount
each pay period. If the employer agrees to make the additional
deduction for him, such withholding is then considered the tax
required to be deducted.3 -'
G. Members of Armed Forces
As was true during World War II, so too during the present
emergency, special tax treatment is granted to servicemen. All
compensation received by enlisted personnel and the first $200 per
month received by commissioned officers for any month during
any part of which the taxpayer served in a combat zone has been
tax exempt. The expiration date for such exemption had been Jan-
uary 1, 1952.33 The new Act extended the time period to January
1, 1954, and further provided that compensation received for any
28. § 312(a) Rev. Act, adding § 51 (g).
29. § 51(g) (3) and (4). Other special rules appear in subsections (2)
and (5)-(10).
30. § 23 (aa) (7), added by § 308 Rev. Act.
31. Or other limitation period.
32. § 1622(k), added by § 203 Rev. Act; U. S. Treas. Reg. 116, §
405.213 (1952).
33. § 22(b) (13), added by § 202(a) Revenue Act of 1950.
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month during any part of which the recipient was hospitalized as a
result of wounds, disease, or injury incurred while serving in a
combat zone should be exempt on the same terms. There must
have been during all of that month, however, combatant activities
in any combat zone. June 25. 1950 is established as the date on
which combatant activities commenced in Korea.34
During World War II individuals dying while in the military
or naval forces of the United States or other United Nations
were forgiven their income tax for the year of death and the prior
year, in addition to being relieved of income taxes unpaid at the
time of their death. Similar treatment is granted during the present
emergency. Thus, a serviceman dying while in active service in a
combat zone or as a result of wounds, disease, or injury incurred
while so serving is entitled to an abatement for income taxes for
the year of death and prior years ending on or after the first day
of his service in a combat zone after June 24, 1950. In addition
any income taxes due at the date of death are also abated.35 Thus
a serviceman who entered a combat zone at some period prior to
December 31, 1950, and who died in 1952 while in active service
in that zone or as a result of wounds, disease, or injury incurred
thereby, would have his income taxes for the taxable years 1950,
1951, and 1952 forgiven. Claims for refund may be in order.
II. RELIEF PROVISIONS
"Relief" for taxpayers is something of a misnomer. Any so
called "relief" may well work to the disadvantage of some tax-
payer somewhere. Relief provisions are so hedged about that the
unwary taxpayer often finds the relief an additional headache.
However, these were meant to aid the taxpayer, and for lack of bet-
ter classification, it is adopted here.
A. Taxpayers Generally
Of all of the relief provisions of the new Act, only two can be
regarded as applicable to the rank and file taxpayer, the sale and
replacement of residence and the casualty loss carry-back and carry-
over.
1. Sale and Replacement of Residence
For many years last past, taxpayers have lamented the unfair-
34. § 22(b) (13), amended by § 305 (b) Rev. Act.
35. § 154, added by § 334 Rev. Act.
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ness of a tax law that accepted no part of the loss on the sale of a
taxpayer's residence, but claimed a share of the gain.38 Nor were
nontaxable exchange provisions applicable.3 7 The crushing blow,
of course, followed the recent rise in land values. The taxpayer who
sold a low basis home in a high price market and repurchased
another home in the same market, discovered that his cash position
and his tax liability were out of balance. Taxwise, he would have
been better off to burn the house, and buy a new one with the in-
surance money."'
Both the House and the Senate Bills provided relief from tax
on the gain on the house sold if the sale proceeds were promptly
reinvested, the two bills differing only in the time allowed within
which the taxpayer could build and occupy a new house. The
theory of the new law3" is simplicity itself. Gain on the sale of a
residence from and after January 1, 1951 is deferred if the tax-
payer purchases another residence within a year before or after
the sale.40 Any excess of the sale price of the old residence over the
purchase price of the new is recognized gain. To so defer the un-
recognized gain, the basis of the new property is the purchase price
reduced by the unrecognized gain on the sale of the old residence.4 '
When the new home is sold and not replaced, the accumulated gain
will then be taxed.4 2 The recognition of gain will in many cases be
postponed indefinitely. As the taxpayer moves from residence to
residence, qualifying each time, successive gains will be hidden in
the basis, and will be recognized only on the final sale without re-
purchase. Often, the gain will never be recognized, since the resi-
dence may pass by death and acquire a new basis, ready to begin
again. 
3
Purchase and selling prices in each case generally follow the
usual concepts, a mortgage or other indebtedness being included in
each. 44 Purchase price deviates from the usual basis concepts where
part of the new property is acquired by gift or inheritance. In such
36. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(e)-1, § 29.22(a)-1 (1943).
37. I. T. 1587, I-1 Cum. Bull. 26 (June, 1923).
38. § 112(f) before 1951 amendment.
39. § 112(n), added by § 318 Rev. Act.
40. The new residence could have been purchased in 1950, so long
as the sale of the old was in 1951.
41. § 112(n) (4) ; § 113(b) (1) (K).
42. For capital gain determination, the holding period of the new resi-
dence includes that of the old residence. § 117(h) (7).
43. § 113(a) (5).
44. If the house sold or bought includes furniture or other non-fixture
items, they must be removed from the computation.
19521
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case only the taxpayer's own expenditures are considered "pur-
chase price" for purposes of this section.45
For the average taxpayer, who sells his house and buys another
for indefinite use, there should be little difficulty. If the opportunity
arises to counsel from the beginning, the statute can be met with
comparative ease. It should be noted that the provisions are man-
datory, the taxpayer has no option. If he desires to recognize his
gain, and thereby increase the basis of the new residence, he should
be advised to wait out the time limit. This could be desirable, for
example, where the taxpayer plans to use the house as his principal
residence at once, but foresees the possibility of future rental per-
mitting depreciation.
In addition to purchase and sale, the statute encompasses ex-
change, compulsory or involuntary conversion, and* construction. 0
A specific provision covers a tenant stockholder in a cooperative
apartment corporation. 47 Houseboats and house trailers are in-
cluded by implication.' 8
The complexities of the statute result from the effort to prevent
use of the relief measure as a tax evasion (or avoidance, if that has
a mellower sound) scheme, and from the attempt to forsee all pos-
sible variations of the vagaries of casual taxpayers. Therein, as
always, lie the traps for the nonplanning taxpayer.
There are these important rules: (a) the taxpayer must "use"
the new property as his residence within the time period ;49 (b) if
the taxpayer purchases a new residence and reconstructs or improves
it, he can credit only so much of the cost of acquisition, reconstruc-
tion and improvements as fall within the time period; (c) if the
taxpayer's purchase precedes the sale of his old residence and the
new one is disposed of by sale or otherwise before the sale of the
old one, he has forfeited the opportunity to defer the gain; (d) if
the taxpayer voluntarily buys and uses more than one residence,
only the last one within a year from the sale of the old residence is
used for nonrecognition treatment, gain on intermediate sales being
taxable; but if destruction, loss, condemnation, or sale under threat
45. Report of Committee on Ways and Means of House of Representa-
tives on H.R. 4473, H.R. Rep. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § VII, Title III,
§ 303 (1951), hereafter cited Ways and Means Comm.
46. § 112(n) (2) (A) (B) (C) (D). Involuntary conversion of residence
property has been removed from § 112(f) and falls exclusively under §
112(n).
47. § 112(n)(5).
48. Sen. Fin. Comm. § VI(A) (5).
49. There is no requirement that he be using the old residence at the
time of the sale.
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of condemnation of an intermediate residence occurs, a gain there-
on will not be recognized, and a new year begins with that event;
(e) the nonrecognition treatment can be used on a voluntary basis
only once in a year's time, the gain on a second sale within a year
of the first being fully recognized and taxed; but an involuntary
conversion or sale under threat of condemnation receives non-
recognition treatment even though within a year of a previous non-
recognized gain.50 The same rules apply generally to a taxpayer
who constructs a new house, except that he has until 18 months
from the date of sale of the old residence to qualify.51 Cost incur-
red after 18 months may not be used to offset gain on the old
residence.52
"Principal residence" is the persistent statutory phrase, but
no definition is offered. Little difficulty should ensue on the usual
facts involving the bona fide home of the taxpayer, but one can fore-
see certain troublesome fact situations and problems of allocation.
Temporary rental of the old or new residence may or may not
affect the taxability of the gain, though it would seem wise to avoid
it if possible, or at least to limit the rental period since the require-
ment of "use" of the new residence, the concept of "principal resi-
dence", and the time limits militate against renting. Often the tax-
payer's residence and business occupy the same structure, or proper-
ty, or some portion of the property is devoted to the production of
income. Only gain from the residential portion (including environs
and out-buildings) is entitled to nonrecognition, and only the pro-
ceeds allocable to the old residence need be reinvested in the new
residence. Allocations can range from the relatively simple, e.g.,
a duplex, to the complex, e.g., house and store, or farm property.
The problem can be compounded by a double allocation, e.g., sale of
a farm and purchase of another. The values of the respective resi-
dences must be separated out for section 112(n) treatment. Limit-
ed experience so far suggests a tendency to be overly generous in
the allocation to the residence, which lends a certain instability to
the transaction.
Careful attention must be given to the basis records of residential
property. The new provision can create a "fluttering basis" where
a residence is purchased before sale. At the time of purchase, the
basis is cost. Additions or reductions may occur before the sale of
the old residence. On the sale of the old residence, the basis of the
50. Sen. Fin. Comm. § VI(A) (5).
51. § 112(n) (2) (G).
52. §112(n)(4).
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new one will drop by the amount of the gain unrecognized. If any
gain remains to be recognized at that point, improvements within a
year from the sale will decrease the recognized gain, and the basis.
Improvements thereafter increase the basis again.
Two additional problems arise in connection with the new sale
of residence provisions that demand careful compliance by the tax-
payer or his attorney. Because oi the common pattern of placing
all or part of the title to residential property in a spouse's name,
provision is made to apply the nonrecognition treatment to such
property if the parties consent to an allocation between them of
the unrecognized gains and the resultant basis adjustment. 3 This
is proper even though the title to the new residence is different than
the old, so long as one or both hold it. The Secretary is directed to
promulgate regulations relative to the mechanics of consent and
allocation, which should be examined with care upon issue.
Implicit in the law is the possibility that the transactions of sale
and purchase will occur in more than one taxable year. A tax-
payer whose taxable year ended after sale of the old residence but
before purchase of the new one, might fail to qualify for nonrecogni-
tion by proper purchase within the time limit. Even though the
whole transaction occurred within a taxable year, unless there is
a change of return form or poli'cy, no specific report of the trans-
action would be made. Therefore, the reporting burden is thrown
upon the taxpayer by forcing him to start the running of the statute
of limitations. The statute will not begin to run on the assessment
of a deficiency on such transactions until three years from the date
that the taxpayer notifies the Bureau of (a) the cost of the new resi-
dence, (b) an intention not to purchase within the time limit or
(c) his failure to purchase within the period.54
It would seem advisable to bring such report into the office
routine at two points, first as an adjunct to the normal income tax
preparation routine, and second as part of the aftermath of any
real estate closing involving residential property. Here again, regu-
lations will be forthcoming which will establish the mechanics of
reporting.
2. Casualty Loss Carry-Back and Carry-Over
One of the few provisions of the Revenue Act of 1951 that ap-
plies generally to all taxpayers is one that few people hope to use.
The new casualty loss treatment was motivated by the desire to
53. § 112(n) (6).
54. § 112(n) (7) ; § 276(e).
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relieve victims of the 1951 floods, but the relief will extend to many
taxpayers. i
Losses arising from theft, fire, storm, shipwreck or other cas-
ualty, even though the property is not business property nor used
for the production of income, are now treated as a net operating
loss.55 If the loss is not fully offset by the income of the year in
which the loss is incurred, the unexhausted portion may be carried
back one year and offset against the income of that year, and then
forward for five years as an offset against the income of those years.5 6
The new law applies to losses suffered in 1951 (even though the
tax year began in 1950) and thereafter.5 7 An unexhausted 1951
theft or casualty loss may warrant the filing of an amended return
and a claim for refund for the year 1950 (or prior fiscal year). The
loss cannot be used to offset 1952 income until it has been applied
to reduce 1950 income. Any unexhausted portion of the loss may
then be carried forward and offset against income of 1952, 1953,
1954, 1955 and 1956. Losses incurred in 1952 that do not exhaust
1952 income will be used as an offset first against income of 1951,
and then carried forward against the years 1953-57.5
B. Business and Farm
Five provisions relative to businessmen, farmers, and ranchers
are noteworthy. Two represent partial legislative solutions to prob-
lems that have resulted in too much litigation, i.e., family partner-
ships and sales of livestock held for draft, breeding or dairy pur-
poses. One settles the sharply drawn issue involving the taxability
of growing crops sold with the land. The others are limited, relat-
ing to replacement of LIFO inventories and net operating losses of
1948 and 1949.
1. Family Partnership
The 1951 Act attempts to set the family partnership squabbles
on a somewhat firmer base henceforward. For pre-1951 years, the
taxpayer and the Bureau must hammer out their own conceptions
of "really and truly" under the decisions.5 9
55. § 122(d) (5), amended by § 344(a) Rev. Act.
56. § 122(b).
57. § 344(a) Rev. Act.
58. At this writing, the 1952 flood losses have piled up. Mechanics of
record keeping and proofs should be restudied so that full losses can be sup-
ported.
59. The Culbertson boys have come full circle. The fifth and latest
(hopefully, the last) time around, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found a partnership. Culbertson v. CIR, 194 F. 2d 581 (5th Cir. 1952). On
the same day, the same court handed down an opinion in Alexander v. CIR,
194 F. 2d 921 (5th Cir. 1952), involving a family partnership under pre-
1951 law, which contains an excellent statement of the philosophy of analysis.
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The new law has no bearing on pre-1951 years and it expressly
states that no inferences shall be drawn from the fact that the
section is not made applicable to earlier years. This was the House's
idea. The Senate would have made the new law retroactive to and
including the year 1939 at the election of a partner.60
The new provisions6' really amount to a statement of principles,
rather than a detailed set of rules, and it is indeed doubtful that
anything more than that could be successfully phrased. In a sense,
the statement of policy is general directive to the courts and Bureau
pregnant with the danger that both the courts and Bureau will as-
sume that they have been following the policy all along.
In any event, the statute is aimed primarily at clarification of
the tax status of the partnership interest obtained by gift. To that
end it declares that where capital is a material income producing
factor, the distributive share of a partnership interest received by
gift is to be taxed to the donee, and such share is not to be dimin-
ished because of the partner's absence due to military service. Then
follow the "except" clauses which remove some of the apparent
force of the previous sentence, but are necessary restraints on over-
zealous taxpayers and counsel. If the share of the donee partnership
is determined without allowance for reasonable compensation for
the services of the donor, or if the allocation of earnings to the
donated capital is out of propo:rtion to the donor's remaining capital,
a rejuggling of the distributive income will be in order. It would
seem that the "reasonable compensation" restriction lays open
about the same problems as have arisen in connection with salary
deductions in close corporations.6 2 The other restriction ought not
to be overly troublesome. A "purchase" by a family member (de-
fined as an individual's spouse, ancestors, lineal descendants, and
any trust for them6 3) is regarded as a gift, and the value of the
capital interest acquired is the fair market value of that interest."'
The provisions are short and general in nature making it neces-
sary to seek the Congressional philosophy in the Committee Re-
60. Sen. Fin. Comm. § VI (A) (7).
61. Amendment of definition in § 3797(a) (2) and addition of § 191 by
§ 340 Rev. Act.
62. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(a)-6 (1943).
63. This would suggest approval of those cases recognizing that a trust
may be a partner, e.g., Maiatico 7. CIR, 183 F. 2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ;
Louis R. Eisenmann, 17 T. C. No. 173 (Feb. 29, 1952). Contra: Hanson v.
Birmingham, 92 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Iowa 1950). The Bureau assumes it. See
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ports, which show surprising unanimity of thought and purpose.
Both reports considered the treatment of the family partnership at
odds with that of other business forms, reiterated the basic prin-
ciple of taxing income from capital to the owner of capital and
income from services to the renderer of the service. They criticized
tests based upon "intention," "business purposes," "reality," and
"control" which have resulted in a tendency to ignore the change of
ownership that results from a completed gift. In a word, the Con-
gressional test of the right to income from a donated partnership
interest is "ownership," as recognized for property law purposes.
This, of course, is tempered by the recognition of shams, and of the
gloss on so much of the Code resulting from the Clifford-Horst
concepts." ' Tongues must have tickled cheeks when the Committees
wrote"6 that the ".... amendment leaves the Commissioner and the
courts free to inquire . . . whether the donee actually owns the
interest. . . . All the facts and circumstances . . . may be taken
into consideration in determining the bona fides... of a purported
gift or sale" !87
It is obvious that no simple answer has been achieved by statute,
though some areas of respectability have been more clearly defined.
The completed gift will be recognized as creating a valid partner-
ship where capital is a material income producer, and the distribu-
tive shares are reasonable. A trust may be regarded as the owner
of a partnership interest. Restrictions on the donated property
will be considered proper, if of a character incident to the normal
relations between partners, or if held in a fiduciary capacity, a rec-
ognition of possible arrangements involving a managing partner,
a limited partnership, or a donor-trustee.6 However, any taxpayer
would be well advised to use extreme caution in creating'these pow-
ers, even though permitted by local business or property law, since
they make the basis for an intensive factual haggle.
Thus despite the new provisions, the post-1951 family partner-
ship is subject to scrutiny in these respects: (a) bona fides of the
gift or sale, (b) retention of powers of control by the donor or
seller regardless of the vehicle for retention, (c) determination of
65. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940) ; Helvering v. Horst,
311 U. S. 112 (1940) and their innumerable progeny, legitimate and other-
wise. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21, 22 (1943).
66. Sen. Fin. Comm. § VI (A) (7) ; Ways and Means Comm. § V (M).
67. It is not likely that this will be passed over. See Mim. 6767, 1952
Int. Rev. Bull. No. 7 at 6 (1952) for pre-1951 Bureau position, which sug-
gests lines of attack that may be pursued for 1951 and subsequent years.
68. This is Committee talk; no such statement appears in the statute.
See note 66 slipra.
19521
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the extent to which capital is an income producing factor, (d)
propriety of the allocation of the distributive shares, and (e) reality
of the distribution. Although the family partnership often results
from the effort to spread income, a factor justifying the suspicious
attitude of courts and Bureau,69 the current provision tends to
eliminate motive or at least to soft pedal it.
2. Sale of Livestock
Some of the storms that raged about the Bureau's interpreta-
tion of section 117(j) have been stilled by the Revenue Act of
1951,70 but it is not yet permissible for farmers and ranchers to
convert feeders to breeders by any of the sleight of hand suggestions
currently made. It is not conceivable that the Bureau will be any
less interested in methods and records of farmers and ranchers,
even though prior Bureau tests have been roughly handled by the
Congress.7' Less trouble should arise on draft and dairy animals,
the problems of proof being relatively easier. Most of the bitterness
comes in connection with the determination of breeding stock.
Though section 117(j) did not previously mention livestock, it
was conceded that these were covered.72 The House amendment to
the new law would have done no more than spell this out and extend
the holding period to 12 months, without specific reference to the
beginning of the period. The Senate version, which became law,
added specificity, providing that: the age of the animal is not material
and measuring the 12 months period from the date of acquisition of
the animal, not from the date it was put to use for draft, breeding,
or dairy purposes. Poultry was eliminated from capital gain treat-
ment by the Senate.
The amendment to section 117(j) draws a sharp line between
pre-1951 and post-1951 transactions. For the years 1942 through
1950, the taxpayer's holding period is six months. For 1951 and
69. But see the Alexander case, supra note 59 and Mim. 6767, 1952 Int.
Rev. Bull. No. 7 at 6 (1952) for a more realistic approach. The emphasis
must be upon the reality of the partnership, not the tax consequences of
recognition.
70. § 117(j), amended by § 324 Rev. Act.
71. And by the-courts: in Lasater v. Scofield, Civ. No. 577 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 29, 1952) the taxpayer beat the "culled from the herd" argument by a
motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). And by the
taxpayer's counsel: Ver Ploeg, Income Tax on Sales of Livestock as Con-
fused by Mimeograph 6660, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 57 (1951). In fairness to prior
practice it must be said that the "culled from the herd" position of the
Bureau has considerable logical justification. The same cannot be said for the
more recent "substantial useful life" test.
72. Mim. 6660, 1951 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 15 at 3 (1951); I. T. 3666,
1944 Cum. Bull. 270; I. T. 3712, 1945 Cum Bull. 176.
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succeeding years the holding period is 12 months. It is arguable
that poultry is included for years before 1951,73 since the provision
banning poultry was effective for years beginning in 1951.
Several problems have cropped up since the passage of the
Act, and others are to be expected. The retroactive aspect of the
statute raises the advisibility of filing claims for refund on open
years if capital gain treatment was not claimed. It is not to be ex-
pected that the Bureau will look with greater favor on these claims
than any others, even though recent instructions may have author-
ized settlement of cases presently in issue.7 4 Careful examination of
the taxpayer's books, records, proof and returns, and consideration
of his position upon an audit must precede the decision to file.
Some confusion has existed in connection with the method of
handling such livestock. The raised animal of the cash basis tax-
payer presents no problem, but some taxpayers apparently do not
claim depreciation on purchased animals. Such depreciation nor-
mally must be recognized when computing gain on the sale, and
failure to claim it results in a loss of a deduction against ordinary
income.7 5
The accrual basis taxpayer, who kept draft, breeding or dairy
animals in his inventory has discovered that his treatment is not as
favorable as his cash basis neighbor. It seemingly gives him no
comfort to point out that he adopts an accounting system and takes
the bitter with the better. Both the House and Senate Committee
reports state that such gains shall be computed according to the
taxpayer's accounting method. Inventoried animals take as their
basis for computing gain the value in the opening inventory.-, It is
true that the accrual basis taxpayer may have paid tax at ordinary
rates on the increase in inventory value from year to year while
the cash basis taxpayer did not, but that is a concomitant of his
selected method. Partial recovery might be achieved by removing
the livestock from inventory to depreciation schedule and claiming
depreciation thereafter. The suggestion has been made by revenue
73. Glenn E. Mfagee, 17 T. C. No. 195 (far. 21, 1952). Taxpayer en-
titled to capital gain treatment on liquidation of turkey flock against Com-
missioner's argument that no distinction existed between breeding turkeys
and non-breeding turkeys because of the short life and single breeding year.
74. 1952 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 7 at 5 (1952) revokes Mim. 6660 without
reinstating I. T. 3666 or I. T. 3712, and informs collectors, agents in charge,
and heads of field divisions of the Appellate Staff that they may dispose of
cases "if, under the circumstances of the case, the treatment prescribed by
section 117(j) of the Code, as amended, is clearly applicable."
75. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.113(b) (1)-1 (1943).
76. § 113 (a) (1).
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officials that removal from inventory to depreciation schedule is a
change of accounting method, requiring permission of the Commis-
sioner. It is believed that the accrual basis taxpayer has the option
to inventory purchased livestock for his convenience, but that they
properly are depreciable items, and that to adjust to proper treat-
ment represents no change of method. Similar removal of raised live-
stock from inventory would not do violence to accounting theory,
although regulations relating to the farm price and unit livestock
methods of inventories infer otherwise."
The most acute problems in this connection are expected in
proving the fact of holding for breeding purposes. Proof of draft
or dairy purposes seems less troublesome. Undoubtedly the Bureau
will take some comfort from the pre-1951 cases78 which seemed
to require that an animal produce, or be old enough to, before it
was proved to be so held. This seems to go too far; but it must be
admitted that the quantum of proof is troublesome.7 9 It would seem
that the tax adviser should examine the method of separation and
bookkeeping used by the taxpayer and insist that some formalized
method or pattern be adopted. to set aside, select, or determine the
animals to be held as breeders. Such should be provable on physical
facts and as a matter of record. It would seem clear that confusion
in the taxpayer's selection or recording methods will weight heavi-
ly against his assertions of sales of breeding stock.
3. Sale of Unharvested Crop
The new Act 0 settles the sharp difference that arose between
the Tax Court and the district courts over the tax treatment of
growing crops sold with land. Both the Bureau' and the Tax
Court8 2 saw the crops as held primarily for sale to customers and
therefore required the value of the crops treated as ordinary income.
The Federal district courts drew upon their property law to see
the crops as part of the land and non-separable for tax purposes.8 3
The new amendment to section 117(j) regards crops as part of
77. U.S. Treas. Reg 111, § 29.22(c)-6 (1943).
78. William Wallace Greer, Jr., 17 T. C. No. 114 (Dec. 7, 1951)
James L. McDonald, 17 T. C. No. 25 (Aug. 14, 1951); Walter S. Fox, 16
T. C. No. 854 (April 20, 1951). See also colloquy and letters, 97 Cong. Rec. 12,
585 et seq. (Sept. 28, 1951).
79. For recent discussion, see Comment, 24 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 231, 234
(1952).
80. §§ 117(j) (3), 24(f), and § 113(b) (1) (L), added by § 323 Rev. Act.
81. I. T. 3815, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 30.
82. Earnest A. Watson, 15 T. C. 800 (1950); Thomas J. McCoy, 15
T. C. 828 (1950).
83. Cole v. Smyth, 96 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Irrgang v.
Fahs, 94 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Fla. 1950), 35 Minn. L. Rev. 615 (1951).
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the land and permits capital gain treatment of the proceeds if the
usual 117(j) tests are met, (i.e., used in trade or business, held for
more than six months, etc.) and if the crops and land are sold, or
exchanged (or compulsorily or involuntarily converted), to the
same person at the same time.
However, recognition of the fact that the cost of producing the
crop would normally be deducted against ordinary income results
in a denial of the deduction of the costs of raising the crop. Thus,
a new section 24(f) denies the deductions pertaining to raising the
crop and a new section 113(b) (1) (L) provides that the total
amount of such costs shall be the basis of the crop for purposes of
determining the gain on the sale. It is difficult to see how well this
requirement can be met practically. In theory, the mill would grind
so fine as to reach the proportionate share of the depreciation on the
pump that provides water to quench the thirst of the hired man
on the days he works in the fields. Where the whole farm is sold,
with crops, and the crops represent the only produce, presumably
all expense items went to produce that crop. Expenses deducted in
a previous year applicable to the crop sold would also be disallowed.
The seller no longer cares abotit allocation of selling price to
land and crops. Failure to make such a segregation in the sale con-
tract can trap the buyer. When he harvests and sells the crops,
he receives ordinary income measured by the difference between
the proceeds on the sale and the amount that he can prove to be
the basis of the crops in his hands."'
4. Replacement of LIFO Inventories
The Act fills a hole in the provisions relating to replacement of
LIFO inventories involuntarily liquidated.8 5 Previous provisions
permitted replacement of inventories depleted during World War II
prior to the end of 1952, thereby qualifying for refunds for the year
of liquidation. 0 Subsequent legislation provided for similar re-
placement of liquidated inventories prior to the end of 1955.87 How-
ever, the law required that replacement be attributed to the most
recent liquidations not replaced. 8 The overlapping of the two
periods meant that a replacement before the end of 1952 had to be
84. For a taxpayer in such straits, see Marian L. Bloxom, ff 52,079 P-H
Memo TC (March 24, 1952).
85. § 22(d) (6) (F) (iii) before amendment.
86. § 22(d) (6) (A); Mim. 6361, 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 126, providing for
interim or accelerated refunds.
87. § 22(d) (6) (F).
88. § 22(d) (6) (C).
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regarded as replacement of liquidation resulting from the emer-
gency, thus making it difficult to replace World War II liquidations
within the qualifying time.
The new law solves that problem by providing that replace-
ments made prior to 1953 are to be first considered as replacements
of World War II liquidations. It applies to taxable years ending
after June 30, 1950.1o The effect of this provision will of course be
limited to taxpayers who made timely notification of intent to re-
place such liquidated inventories. 90
5. Net Operating Loss
In 1950, the Revenue Act of that year changed the treatment
of the net operating loss carry-back and carry-over from two years
each way to one year back and five years forward.91 This was effec-
tive for losses occurring in 1950 and later years,0 2 while losses of
prior years remained on the old basis of four years.9 3
The latest enactment, the Revenue Act of 1951, permits net
operating losses of the years 1948 and 1949 (or fiscal years be-
ginning in 1948 or 1949) to be carried forward for one additional
year for a total of three years. 94 The two year carry-back for those
years remains, making a total' of five offsetting years for 1948 and
1949 losses. Thus, if a 1948 net operating loss was not exhausted by
the income of 1946, 1947, 1949 and 1950, it should have been used
to offset 1951 income. Such a loss for 1949 would be applied against
the income of 1947, 1948, 1950, 1951 and 1952. Losses in 1950
and subsequent years fall into the regular six year pattern, one
year back and five years forward.
C. Mines and Minerals
Tax advantages for mines flow from the 1951 Act in four
specific areas. The percentage depletion provisions have been liberal-
ized; limited deductions for exploration expense are now permitted;
development expense of mines may be currently deducted, if the tax-
payer so elects; and special capital gains treatment is granted to
coal royalty contracts. None of these provisions refer to oil and gas
wells.
1. Extension of Percentage Depletion
The Act extends percentage depletion to additional minerals
89. § 306 (b) Rev. Act.
90. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(d) -7 (1943).
91. § 215(a) Revenue Act of 1950, amending § 122(b).
92. § 215(b) Revenue Act of 1950; § 122(b) (2) (B).
93. § 122(b) (2) (A) before amendment by 1951 Act.
94. § 330(b) Rev. Act, adding § 122(b) (2) (C).
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and increases the allowable percentage on some others,95 effective
for years beginning after December 31, 1950.96
Percentage depletion at the rate of five per cent (5%o) is ex-
tended to the following minerals: sand, gravel, slate, stone (includ-
ing pumice and scoria), brick and tile clay, shale, oyster shell,
clam shell, granite, marble, sodium chloride, and, if from brine
wells, calcium chloride, magnesium chloride, and bromine.
7
Coal is increased to a ten per cent (10%) rate, and there is
added to the list entitled to such rate: wollastonite, asbestos, cal-
cium carbonates (other than marble and oyster and clam shell),
perlite, dolomite, brucite, magnesite, and magnesium carbonates. 98
At a fifteen per cent (15%o) rate, the following are added: borax,
fuller's earth, tripoli, refactory and fire clay, quartzite, aplite, garnet,
diatomaceous earth, and metallurgical and chemical grade lime-
stone. With respect to thenardite, previously in the fifteen per
cent class, the parenthetical limitation "from brines or mixtures
of brine" is stricken. 99
2. Exploration Expenses
Prior to the 1951 Act, exploration expense was capitalized and
recovered through the allowance for depletion, or taken as a loss
if no results were obtained. 100 Where percentage depletion was used,
the capitalized cost had no relationship to the amount of the de-
pletion deduction.
The new law permits deduction of expenditures "for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the existence, location, extent, or quality" of
mineral deposits, except oil and gas.' 0 ' Two limitations exists: (a)
the costs are those paid or incurred prior to the development stage
of the mine or deposit, and (b) the total deductable expense under
this section for any one year cannot exceed $75,000. The latter is a
limitation on expenses for each taxpayer, not for each mine or ex-
ploratory venture. In addition the statute spells out a limitation
that is logically inherent; to wit, the cost of depreciable property
is not an exploration expense, but the actual depreciation allowance
on such property may very well be an exploration cost.
10 2
95. § 319(a) Rev. Act.
96. § 319(c) Rev. Act.
97. § 114(b) (4) (A) (i).
98. § 114(b) (4) (A) (ii).
99. § 114(b) (4) (A) (iii).
100. I. T. 4006, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 48.
101. §342(a) Rev. Act adding" § 23(ff).
102. §23(ff) (1)
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The provision is optional with the taxpayer, up to a point.
He may elect whether to deduct or treat as a deferred expense the
first $75,000 of exploration expense; any excess is to be capitalized
in either event. His election is made each year, and is binding only
for that year.10 3 However, this is a four strike game. When the
taxpayer (including any predecessor whose basis he had to adopt),
has taken the deduction or made the election to defer the expense in
any four years, his privilege under the section expires, and all such
costs must be capitalized thereafter.10'
Exploration costs treated as deferred expenses under the option
are subject to amortization and deductable on a ratable basis as the
units of produced ores or minerals are sold. These deferred expenses
will go to increase the adjusted basis of the property for gain or loss,
and the amortization thereof will decrease the basis, but such ex-
penses will not affect the basis for depletion. 05 The deferred explora-
tion expenses thus stand alone, and are not absorbed into the de-
pletion deduction. It would appear that for taxpayers using cost de-
pletion, the exploration expense deduction serves in lieu of the
depletion deduction, while under percentage depletion, it may be in
addition to the allowance for depletion. Capitalization of expenses
beyond the limitations fall into the old pattern of recovery by
depletion.
3. Development Expenses
Costs of developing mining property prior to the productive
stage have hitherto been capitalized and recovered through the
allowance for depletion. 10 After the production stage is reached
continued expenditures necessary to maintain production are gen-
erally deductible currently, while extraordinary expenditures are
treated as deferred expenses allocable to the production and sale
of the ores or minerals benefited thereby. 0 7
Now, the taxpayer is authorized to deduct development ex-
penses in the year paid or incurred, but he may elect to treat them
as deferred expenses recoverable on a ratable basis as the ores or
minerals so benefited are sold.'08 The amount deferrable in any
103. § 23(ff) (2).
104. §23(ff) (3).
105. § 23(ff) (4).
106. To the extent that there were net receipts, such costs were offset,
and the excess capitalized. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(m)-15 (1943).
107. Ibid. Problems of determining when the production stage begins
are unchanged.
108. § 23(cc), added by § 309(a) Rev. Act. The deduction is not al-
lowed for costs deferred by a prior owner from whom the property was
purchased.
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one year is limited to the excess over net receipts from ore or
minerals produced. The election to defer may be made annually,
and must include all of the development expenses (or excess, as the
case may be) for the particular mine or deposit involved.10 9
This section ties in with the exploratory section, and the de-
velopment stage is assumed to begin "after the existence of ores or
minerals in commercially marketable quantities has been dis-
closed."'"" As in the exploratory expense rules, here too cost of
depreciable property is not a proper development expense, but the
allowance for depreciation may be. Similarly, if election is made
to defer the expense, the basis for gain or loss is thereby increased,
and as the deferred expense is amortized, the basis is adjusted
downward."' Such expenditures, however, are not to affect the
basis for depletion. The latter point is justified as a means of pre-
venting duplication of tax benefit."' 2 This is true with respect to
cost depletion, but it could redound to the additional advantage of
the taxpayer tising percentage depletion." 3
Regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary under the
exploration and development provisions will probably not be notable
for their brevity. Much detailed explanation can be expected as
well as provisions relating to the method of electing the options for
exploration and development expenses. It will behoove the tax-
payer to examine each year with care and to forecast his future
operations and the fate of his industry. Each election will bind him
for that year, although he is free to shift in another year. The
four time limitation on exploration elections and the overall limit
should be an important guide. It may be as easy to start exploring
after the turn of the taxable year as before, thus building the ex-
pense deduction close to the limit rather than spreading it over
two years to waste the dollar limit and an extra strike.
4. More Capital Gains
The owners of timber contracts had it.""' Now the owners of
coal royalties have it, and for this purpose "coal" includes lignite.1 5
By amendment to section 117(k) (2) if coal in place, held for
109. § 23(cc) (2). Note the absence of dollar or time limitations. Cf.
Exploration Expenses, text p. 851 supra.
110. § 23(cc) (1).
111. Ibid.
112. Sen. Fin. Comm. § VI (A) (10).
113. But see argument of Sen. Fin. Comm. that percentage depleters
were discriminated against. Ibid.
114. § 117(k) (2), added in 1943.
115. § 325(b) Rev. Act, amending § 117(k) (2).
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more than six months is sold under a contract by which the owner
retains an economic interest in the coal, the difference between the
amount realized and the adjusted depletion basis shall be regarded
as a gain or loss upon the sale of the coal. This brings the transaction
within the scope of section 117(j) so that the net gain (from this
and other section 117(j) assets) is treated as a long term capital
gain. However, the owner is -thereby denied an allowance for per-
centage depletion. The date of disposal of the coal is specified as the
date that it is mined, not the date of the leasing or royalty contract'1
thus fixing the holding period. This makes it possible to fix the
holding period at more than six months, 117 while firming the deal
at an earlier date. The new provision applies regardless of the
contract date, but only to amounts received in years beginning after
December 31, 1950.
A possible trap exists in the provision of the statute that denies
capital gain treatment on this type of transaction if the owner of
the coal is involved in the mining of it as a co-adventurer, partner,
or principal. It is proper to assume that sham transactions arranged
to cloud the owner-operator aspect will be quickly challenged.
D. Employees
Several provisions redound to the benefit of particular em-
ployees. These provisions are [imited to special situations, and some
represent no new conceptions but are extensions or clarifications of
positions taken under previous acts. However, it seems advisable
to mention them since affected persons may be unaware of the pro-
visions and it becomes counsel's responsibility to recognize the tax
advantages.
1. Termination Payments
Where an employment contract provides for payments to an
employee, after termination of employment, based upon a sharing
of future profits or receipts, such payments are in the nature of
deferred compensation, taxable as ordinary income, whether re-
ceived as a lump sum, or in installments.'" To leave his retire-
ment funds to the risk of the business after the taxpayer left it, or
to take a lump sum payment and share a substantial amount of it
with his fellow taxpayers was a choice that would shake Hobson.
The new Act dulled the second horn of the dilemma.
116. Cf; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.117-8 (1943).
117. To qualify under § 117(j).
118. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-2 (1943).
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In certain cases an employee may now release all such rights and
accept a lump sum payment, which will be treated as a long term
capital gain. 1 9 The statutory provision is highly restrictive, re-
quiring (a) employment by the contracting employer for more
than 20 years, (b) that the released rights be a part of the employ-
ment terms for not less than 12 years, (c) that the released rights
extend for life or for not less than five years,320 (d) that the release
be made after termination of employment, and convey all rights to
future profits, but no other rights, and (e) that the funds be re-
ceived after termination of employment and in one taxable year.
Any attempt to convert ordinary income to capital gain under
this provision amounts to an exercise in meeting the exact statutory
conditions. Some factual arguments will appear, but generally it
should be clear whether or not the statute can be met.
2. Stock Purchase Option
Favorable treatment was granted to an employee exercising
a "restricted stock option" granted by his employer corporation
under section 130A of the Code.12 1 No taxable income resulted from
the exercise of such an option if at the time of granting the option
the option price was as least 85% of the market price, even though
at the time of exercise the market price far exceeded the purchase
price.12
Where the option had to be approved by stockholders, normal
delay in securing such approval could result in disqualifying the
option under the 85% limitation if the market rose. To insure
continuous qualification of this "incentive device," the current
Act provides that the market value on the date of granting rather
than on the date of approval of the option shall determine whether
the 85% limit is met.12 3 Thus, the provision is limited to those
options which must be approved, whether the requirement of ap-
proval is express or implied or arises by voluntary submission. The
amendment covers any modification, extension or renewal of the
option. It is effective as if it had been enacted as part of section 218
119. § 117(p), addedby § 329(a) Rev. Act.
120. There can be trouble here. The statute would seem to demand a
specific provision to this effect, yet the Chairman of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee on the floor of the Senate denied it, suggesting if the rights "were
likely to" or "probably would" or "might well" extend beyond five years,
they would be covered. 97 Cong. Rec. 13903 (Oct. 19, 1951).
121. Added by § 218(a) Revenue Act of 1950.
122. § 130A, modifying Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U. S. 177 (1945),
U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-1, and I. T. 3795, 1946-1 Cure. Bull. 15.
123. § 130A(d) (5), added by § 331 (a) Rev. Act.
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of the Revenue Act of 1950,124 that is, for taxable years ending after
December 31, 1949.125
3. Stock Distributions under P"rofit Sharing Plans
This provision is also designed to bolster up a benefit or relief
provision previously existing. Where, in a single year, an employee
withdraws from a pension or profit sharing fund, exempt under
section 165,126 the total amoun,: payable to him because of his leav-
ing the service of his employer, the excess of the cash or market
value of stock received over the amount he contributed to the fund
is treated as a long term capital gain.127 Where the fund had been
invested in stock of the employer corporation and the stock had ap-
preciated in value, the employee, under this rule, was being taxed
upon the appreciation at the time he received the stock, although he
had not realized the income through disposition of the stock.
The new Act reaches this feature and provides that the apprecia-
tion in value of securities of the employer corporation, accruing
between the time of deposit in the fund and the time of distribution
to the employee, shall be taxed when the securities are sold or dis-
posed of, rather than in the year received.1 28 Thus the "amount real-
ized" in the year of withdrawal will be the cash plus the amount
that the fund or trust paid for the securities. Regulations to be
issued will fill in the details of the statute relative to the amount of
unrealized appreciation, basis adjustments, holding period,'12 and
definition of securities. 13
0
The amendment suggests two lines of tax planning. If such
stock or securities are retained and passed through the employee's
estate the unrealized gain will never be picked up for income tax
purposes. Where an employee withdraws his share on retirement,
a judicious plan of liquidation over the subsequent years while his
income is low can reduce the taxes on the total appreciation to a
negligible figure.
124. § 331(b) Rev. Act.
125. § 218(b) Revenue Act of 1950. See T. D. 5911 (June 5, 1952).
126. Certain trusts or plans set up for the benefit of employees which
meet the specifications of § 165 result in current deductions to the em-
ployer, no income tax to the trust, and deferment of taxability of the income
of the employee until distribution. §§ 23(p), 165(a), 165(b).
127. § 165(b) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.165-6 (1943).
128. § 335 (a) Rev. Act, amending § 165 (b).
129. No suggestion is made in the statute whether the holding period
begins at the time of acquisition by the trust, or distribution to employee.
130. A partial definition of "securities" is included in the amendment:
stocks and bonds or debentures, with interest coupons or in registered form,
of the employer corporation, its parent or subsidiaries (as defined in § 130A
(2) and (3)).
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4. Life Insurance Salesmen
In connection with stock bonus, pension, profit sharing and
annuity plans and trusts, a very harsh result was manifest in the
case of a full time life insurance salesman. Because he was techni-
cally not an "employee," on retirement when the rights became
non-forfeitable the entire fund available to him in excess of his
contributions thereto, became immediately taxable as ordinary
income.1 31
The Revenue Act of 195113 - adds a new subsection (20) to sec-
tion 3797(a) specifying that if a full time life insurance salesman is
considered as an employee for Social Security purposes, he shall be
considered as an employee with respect to contributions under a
stock bonus, pension, profit sharing or annuity plan or trust. The
definition is made retroactive to taxable years beginning in 1939.133
Claims for refund may be in order on open years.
Digressing for a moment, comment on the general impact of
these plans may not be amiss at this point. The provisions concern-
ing employee benefit plans in the last Revenue Act are not unex-
pected, since such plans are just burgeoning into full bloom. Other
hardship cases may arise and receive more or less gentle treatment
in subsequent acts. It would seem that no case involving an apparent
harsh result under the words of the statute should be closed as
long as the possibility exists of corrective legislative action or
liberalized Bureau policy based upon the apparent intent of the
Congress to avoid arbitrary results under the benefit plan pattern.
For some years now, interest in such plans was pretty well limited
to corporate attorneys, retained counsel, and specialists in establish-
ing qualified plans. It is already becoming apparent, as the plans
increase and as they begin to pay off to employees and their
beneficiaries, that the lawyer in general practice must add to his
working kit a knowledge of the employee's rights and the tax results
to the individual that inevitably stem from distributions under the
plans, not only for income tax purposes, but also in connection with
his efforts in estate work and planning.
E. Beneficiaries of Decedents
The estate, beneficiary and survivor of a decedent receive favor-
able income tax treatment in three specific situations.
131. Sen. Fin. Comm. § VI (B) (4).
132. § 343 (a) Rev. Act.
133. § 343(b) Rev. Act.
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1. Redemption of Stock to Pay Death Taxes
Under section 1 15 (g) a redemption of stock may be regarded as
"essentially equivalent" to the issuing of a dividend and so taxed. 34
In 1950, the Revenue Act provided that redemption of stock in a
decedent's estate in an amount no more than enough to pay com-
bined death taxes would not be treated as equivalent to a dividend.'O
However, stockholdings of the decedent had to comprise more than
50% of the value of the net estate.3 0 Apparently, the cries of
persons whose stock would comprise a lesser share were heard
by the Senate and it recommended that the restriction be reduced
to 25% of the value of the net estate.137 The provision of the
Revenue Act of 1951 sired by -the Senate Bill and "damned" by
the Conference Committee, came out as "more than 35 per centum
of the value of the gross estate." 138 This may or may not relieve-
it could well be a higher figure than 50% of the net estate.
In a recent article, 39 Mr. Gordon D. Simons offers a plausible,
if depressing, explanation and points out, logically, that the section
should be re-examined. Such relief as is afforded goes to the estate
with shares in a single 40 corporation, but no relief is extended to
the estate with shares in two corporations, each block amounting
to 30% of the gross estate. Such a percentage limitation makes
estate planning difficult since a variation in value of the other
items to be included in the gross estate, a failure to estimate 811 (c)
to (g) items,14' vagaries of valuing the stock itself, inopportune
borrowings that increase the gross estate but not the net, as well
as other factors, increase the hazard of meeting the percentage
limitation on the gross estate. The amendment applies to distribu-
tions made after the date of the Act, October 20, 1951.
-42
2. Joint and Survivor Annuities
Prior law provided that annuity payments made to a survivor
134. Rather than as a "liquidating" dividend under § 115(c) giving rise
to capital gain.
135. § 115(g) (3), added by § 209(a) Revenue Act of 1950.
136. Ibid.
137. Sen. Fin. Comm. § VI (B) (10).
138. § 320(a) Rev. Act, amending § 115(g) (3) ; Proposed Regula-
tions, Reg. 111, § 29.115-9, 17 Fed. Reg. 4240 (1952).
139. Simons, Redemption of Stock to Pay Death Taxes, 30 Taxes 42
(1952), in which the author draws the analogy to two farmers arguing about
the price of corn. One wanted to sell for 50c; the other would buy for 25c
a bushel. So they compromised on 35c per half bushel.
140. ".... Provided, that the value of the stock in such corporation..
§ 115(g) (3).
141. Life time transfers included in gross estate, joint interests, power
property, and insurance.
142. § 320 (b) Rev. Act.
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under a joint and survivor annuity policy were subject to income
tax as a continuation of the original policy."-3 Thus the basis to the





Sections 22(b)(2) and 113(a)(5) were amended by the
Revenue Act of 1951 to provide that where the value of the annuity
is includible in the decedent's gross estate, the survivor's basis for
income tax purposes is the value assigned to the survivor's rights
in the decedent's gross estate.14 5 It applies to survivors of decedents
who died after December 31, 1950.146
3. Payments to Beneficiaries of Deceased Employees
A death benefit paid by an employer to a beneficiary of an em-
ployee up to $5,000 is excluded from gross income of the beneficiary.
In effect, such payments are treated like life insurance proceeds
through amendment of the insurance provision, section 22(b)
(1) .1-7 The payment must be made under a contract binding the em-
ployer to make such payments. The $5,000 exclusion refers to a
payment by a single employer for a single employee. If payments are
made by more than one employer or if a beneficiary receives death
benefits under contracts of more than one employee, there can be
more than one exclusion. Several beneficiaries who share the benefit
will apportion the exclusion. Payments may be made in a single
sum or otherwise, but if the amount is held by the employer under
an agreement to pay interest the interest is taxable.
III. LOOPHOLFS
"Loophole," as any friend of Groucho 1Marx will agree, is a
word to warm political hearts. Great speeches can be built around
closing Big Tax Loopholes. It is true that a few are closed here
and there, but it would be interesting for someone to assess the
revenue protected against the cost of the fuss. The Revenue Act
of 1951 was touted as a "loophole closer," even though it opens
a few questionable ones. It is hard to find many real revenue savers.
A few additional taxpayers are added to the rolls, e.g., state col-
143. I. T. 3653, 1944 Cum. Bull. 75; Anna E. Curtis, 8 T. C. 266 (1947) ;
Ella B. Higgs, 16 T. C. No. 2 (Jan 8, 1951) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22
144. I. T. 3077, 1937-1 Cum. Bull. 136; § 22(b) (2).
145. § 303(a) Rev. Act, amending § 22(b) (2); § 303(b) Rev. Act,
amending § 113(a) (5).
146. § 303(b) Rev. Act.
147. § 302(a) Rev. Act, adding § 22(b) (1) (B).
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leges and universities for unrelated business income,148 farmers' co-
operatives for unallocated dividends, 4 ' savings banks and building
and loan associations, 150 and Federal savings and loan associa-
tions.15' Certain controls have been tightened up, e.g., collapsible
corporations, 52 and investments of security dealers.'3 Informa-
tional techniques are strengthened in the reporting of interest in-
come.15
Two loopholes previously available to the not-much-above-aver-
age taxpayer have been sealed off. The first is the new capital gain
computation; the other is the ban on the sale of depreciable property
to a spouse or a controlled corporation.
A. Capital Gains and Losses
A provision, friendly to many taxpayers for many years, passed
into oblivion with the year 1951. Every tax planner knew the ropes
of offsetting $2 of long term gain with a $1 of short term loss,
and as much as any other provision it became a by-word for year-
end planning.
The new law changes the method of computation of gain or
loss on the sale or exchange of capital assets. 55 Long and short
term gains and losses are segregated as before but long term as
well as short term gains and losses are taken into account in full
instead of at 50%. If the taxpayer's net long term gain exceeds the
net short term loss (or zero, as the case may be), then the taxpayer
is entitled to a deduction in the amount of 50% of the excess of
the net long term gain over the net short term loss. This is effected
by a new section 23(ee).
As far as the individual tax.payer is concerned, the new law may
or may not result in a tax different than under the old system. If
the taxpayer has only a long term gain or a net long term gain, the
new method comes out the same as the old. If he has a net long term
148. § 339 Rev. Act, amending §§ 421(b) (1) and 422(b).
149. § 314(a) Rev. Act, amending § 101 (12).
150. § 313(b) Rev. Act, amending § 101(4) ; § 313 (a) Rev. Act, re-
pealing § 101 (2).
151. § 313(d) Rev. Act, amending HOLC Act, thereby removing the
exemption under § 101 (15).
152. § 326 Rev. Act, amending § 117(m).
153. § 327 Rev. Act, adding § 117(n).
154. § 333 Rev. Act, amending § 147. The Commissioner may now
require information returns in the case of interest payments regardless of
amount.
155. § 322 Rev. Act, amending § 117(c)(2) and § 117(b), "effective
for years beginning after October 20, 1951."
[Vol. 36:832
THE REVENUE ACT OF 1951
gain and a net short term loss, he loses under the new method. If the
taxpayer has a net long term capital loss (in excess of net short
term gain), he may be better off under the new method, since
100% is taken into account against the $1,000 limit 156 and carried
over for five years.
5 7
The alternative tax computation for 1952 and later years will
be changed somewhat because of the capital gains tax rate increase
to 26% and the new method of handling long term gains. Capital
loss carry-over from 1951 is computed under the old law, and
under the new law from 1952 forward. 5 s
Two matters expressly affect trusts and estates. The fiduciary
does not include in computing the 50% deduction the amount of
capital gain to be reported by income beneficiaries." 9 Where any
part of a capital gain is included in a charitable deduction, appro-
priate adjustment must be made in the 23 (ee) deduction.?3 '
B. Sale of Depreciable Property
It is elementary that a piece of property may be depreciated anew
in the hands of each purchasing taxpayer. A hitherto method of con-
verting ordinary income to capital gain used this simple principle.
Suppose low basis property owned by a husband is sold to his wife,
capital gain being recognized and the tax paid. The wife with a new
high basis determined by the cost to her, takes annual deductions
for depreciation offsetting ordinary income. Thus within the family
circle a capital gain is traded for an offset of the same amount against
income taxable at regular rates over a period of years. The same
arrangement could have been worked out between an individual and
his controlled corporation. It is an advantageous deal when the asset
does not leave the inner circle. Such a scheme could be challenged
as sham and if so would fall; but if the sale was complete, it would
stand.
The Revenue Act of 1951 seeks to dissuade the taxpayer by
denying to the seller capital gain treatment. 6" He may of course
go ahead with the plan, but the result will be a piling of ordinary
156. § 117(d).
157. § 117(e).
158. § 322(d) Rev. Act.
159. § 117(b), amended by § 322(a) (2) Rev. Act.
160. § 162(a), amended by § 322(c) (5) Rev. Act.
161. § 117(o), added by § 328 Rev. Act, treats the gain as one from
the sale or exchange of property which is neither a capital asset nor property
included under § 117(j).
1952]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
income in a single year for the seller, while the offsetting deductions
of the buyer are spread over a period of years, normally a dis-
advantageous trade.
The new section 117(o) is narrow, reaching a sale or exchange
of depreciable property only if it is directly or indirectly between
husband and wife, or individual and his controlled corporation.
For this purpose, "control" means more than 80% of the stock
owned by the individual, his spouse and his minor children and
grandchildren. The section applies to taxable years ending after
April 30, 1951, and sales made after May 3, 1951.162
Two points are worth noting. First, the section can be a trap for
a taxpayer who makes such a sale for perfectly legitimate business
reasons without tax advice. Second, the tax advantage still exists
in the family corporation that does not meet the test of control, e.g.,
shares held by adult children, among other relatives and friendly
third parties (though reciprocal sales would hardly be advisable), in
some partnership situations, and in other arrangements whereby the
taxpayer moves through or around the words of the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing represents but a sketch of a part of the Revenue
Act of 1951. It serves only to suggest and invite attention to some
of the sections that may be important to individual taxpayers. Many
other provisions are important to attorneys in general practice. Too
often it is felt that narrow provisions of a tax statute are fodder
for experts in plush offices, and not the concern of little taxpayers
and their attorneys. Yet so many apparently limited, special, or
technical sections reach out and affect the individual taxpayer that
the attorney in general practice is hard pressed to maintain his
awareness in so many unrelated areas. The small cooperative, the
operator of a little quarry, the teacher who took a job abroad, all
affected by the new act, may not be aware of it. The attorney who
settles the farm cooperative's squabbles, who handles the quarry's
property problems, who drafts the will upon the teacher's sudden
realization of the hazards of travel, must also point out that the co-
operative may need to plan for the 1952 tax change, that it would
be worthwhile to determine whether the quarry is entitled to per-
centage depletion, that the teacher's foreign income might be tax
exempt. A more vivid example indicates the effect of a new section
162. § 328(b) Rev. Act.
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of the Code upon an apparently unrelated taxpayer. The new gam-
bling taxes are popularly considered to be designed to cope with
organized crime, yet the Bureau has already had occasion to ex-
plain how small merchants can be liable for the wagering tax as
a result of previously accepted merchandising schemes.1 3
The taxpaying base becomes broader. The Revenue Acts pile
up more detailed provisions. Tax consciousness increases. It seems
to lead to the unhappy result that the little taxpayer's problems
approach those of the big fellow in number and complexity, albeit
not in amount.
163. M. T. 43, 1952 Int. Rev. Bull. 6, 13 (1952) ; Mim. 6814, II 76, 275
P-H (May 22, 1952).
